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Abstract
In recent years, the idea that somatic processes are intimately involved in
actions traditionally considered to be purely mental has come to the fore.
In particular, these arguments have revolved around the concept of somatic
markers, i.e., bodily states that are generated by mind and then reperceived
and acted upon. This chapter considers the somatic marker hypothesis and
related ideas from the point of view of postclassical computation, i.e., the
view that computing can be seen as a property of things-in-the-world rather
than of an abstract class of mathematical machines. From this perspective,
a number of ideas are discussed: the idea of somatic markers extending into
the environment, an analogy with hardware interlocks in complex computer-
driven systems, and connections with the idea of “just-do-it” computation.
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Introduction
One of the main topics of this book is the computational requirements for the
existence of a functioning mind. This could either be a “purely rational” mind, or
it could be a mind with affective capacity. In this chapter, I would like to consider
to what extent it is possible for such a mind to exist in isolation from some form
of “body.” In particular, this question will be considered from the point of view
of postclassical computation, which attempts to ground computation not in
mathematical theories of abstract machines but by an analysis of the computa-
tional capabilities of the real world.
We will take a nondualist perspective as an axiom. Therefore, there is a
requirement for the mind to be realized in some fashion in the physical world. The
aim here is to consider the relationship between those parts of the body that act
as a substrate for mind (in the sense that they could be replaced in a functionalist
fashion by another substrate with no difference) and those parts of the body that
influence mind yet that cannot/are not part of a substitutable substrate. The
“cannot/are not” in the previous sentence can be interpreted usefully at a number
of levels. A strong notion may be that there are no physically possible ways of
realizing the same phenomenon. Some phenomena may admit a weaker notion
in that it is “easier” in some sense (for example, faster, more energy efficient)
for the mind to process this phenomenon using an alternative process rather than
processing it on the neural substrate.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section consists of a review that
gives a context for the current work. This consists of an outline of notions of
embodiment from the cognitive science and robotics literature and the core ideas
of postclassical computation. The main sections of the chapter are concerned
with in-the-world extensions to Damasio’s theory of somatic markers (1994),
connections between notions of the embodied mind and ideas of hardware
interlocks in computing systems, and connections between the mind–body
relationship and “just do it” computation. A final conclusion summarizes the
arguments of the chapter.
Background
This section reviews the two main ideas on which this chapter is based. In the
first part, notions of embodiment from the robotics literature are discussed. The
second part discusses the idea of postclassical computation, i.e., computation
that is based on the properties of physical objects in the world rather than on
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specific abstract models of computing machines. The final part looks at ways in
which these two areas can be linked.
Notions of Embodiment
In recent years, much has been written about the importance of embodiment in
the study of robots and autonomous machines. A definition of embodiment is
given by Quick et al. (1999): basically, the embodied object is able to perturb
some states of the environment and vice versa. There are a number of ways in
which such notions are important for cognitive science research (Quick et al.,
1999; Wilson, 2002; Ziemke, 2001, 2003).
In order for cognition to occur in the world, it has to be realized in some worldly
“stuff.” This alone is sufficient reason for considering notions of embodiment to
be important to the arguments in this chapter. However, there is a second reason
that is yet more relevant: the stuff in which cognition is realized will influence the
cognitive capacity of the system. The brain-substrate, on which neural-network
models of mind reside, opens certain pathways for, and places certain constraints
on, the kinds of computations that can be carried out. By delegating parts of
cognition to the body, a different set of computational affordances (Gibson, 1977;
Norman, 1988) is provided.
A third perspective is that some procedures make use of their being-in-the-world
as part of their functioning. Brooks (1991) said that “the world is its own best
model,” and many artificial cognitive systems consist of a reactive model, taking
information from the world in an implicit fashion and reacting to that information,
rather than building up an internal model of the world.
Another aspect of embodiment is that the actions of an embodied cognitive
system are potentially unlimited. An action carried out on the mental substrate
is limited by the computational capacity of that substrate. However, once a
computation is sent-off-substrate into the world, this restriction is removed.
Postclassical Computation
The aim of this chapter is largely to explore how the perspective offered by
postclassical computation (a.k.a., nonclassical, nonstandard, physically grounded
computation) can inform issues concerned with the embodiment of mind.
Broadly speaking, postclassical computation is concerned with ideas of compu-
tation that come from the world, for example, studying the information-process-
ing capabilities or the information storage capacity of some physical, chemical,
or biological system. This contrasts with the (equally valid) “classical” view of
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computing as a property of certain classes of abstract machines. Readers should
see Stepney et al. (2003) and Stonier (1990) for overviews of some of the ideas
in this area.
The standard view of computing is that it is not concerned with things in the
natural world. Grundy (1998) compared the existence of a science of computers
to “a science called motorcarology.” The gist of this argument is that computing
is a synthetic subject. It is concerned with discovering (empirically grounded,
theoretically supported) guidelines for the creation of computing machines. This
contrasts with the analytic perspective on the world taken by a subject such as
physics or psychology. In such a subject, the aim is to analyze things in the world
using the tools and perspectives offered by the subject in question.
Most of the mature sciences have both an analytic side and a synthetic side to
them. For example, the subjects of chemistry (analytic) and chemical engineer-
ing (synthetic) support each other in understanding and enabling the construction
of objects at the molecular level. However, within computer science, there is
traditionally no analytic perspective. One of the key approaches in postclassical
computation is to consider a computational stance toward objects in the world.
We can ask computational questions, such as the following: What is the
information-processing capacity of that object? How much information can an
object store? How quickly can a particular object transform information, and how
does that contrast with how quickly a traditional computing device might do it?
How is information compressed within that object? How does it achieve a certain
kind of parallel processing of information? What constraints are placed on the
object’s function by the requirement to calculate certain characteristics, retrieve
certain pieces of information, etc.?
It might be the case that computation has only accidentally been discovered
through the creation of computing machines. Feasibly, computational notions
could have been discovered by the analysis of certain objects in the world, before
being applied in a synthetic fashion.
There are a number of areas in which we might see this kind of thinking being
applied in the near future, or where we are beginning to see evidence of this
approach already. One area is in immunology—the immune system can be
viewed as a learning system that takes information from various invasions into
the body and stores information about these in a network that helps the body
distinguish self from nonself (deBoer et al., 1993).
This perspective on immunology allows us to ask computational questions about
the immune system. What is the memory capacity of the system? How does the
system retrieve information about previous infections quick enough to respond
to reinfections by the same or similar antigen? How can the system recognize a
wide variety of infections, and yet still have the capacity to swamp a particular
infection with large amounts of specific lymphocytes when needed? Is informa-
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tion passed between lymphocytes to enable them to deal with infection, or is the
apparent change in specificity a property of the population changing in compo-
sition? How quickly does a rapidly mutating antigen such as the HIV virus have
to change to be able to change quicker than the rate of change in the
immunological memory of the system?
Other areas of physiology can also benefit from being viewed in a computational
fashion. Paton (1996) discussed the benefits to be gained from viewing certain
processes in tissues as being a parallel and distributed system that processes
molecular information. As an example, he discussed the processes found in the
lining tissues of glands in terms of information processing. Using this, he was able
to formulate testable hypotheses about why certain structures in glands have the
forms that they do.
An interesting question is the extent to which computational capabilities of
systems are able to influence the development of those systems. It has already
been demonstrated that the dynamics of a system can influence the overall
behavior of the system. An example comes from the study of certain blood
diseases (Haurie et al., 1998). The distinction between two forms of a disease
comes not from radically different concentrations of substances in the blood or
from a large error in the system, but instead from small changes that upset
periodic feedback patterns in the concentration of platelets in the blood, which
then become very hard to return to equilibrium. Could there be similar problems
that are best understood in terms of computational constraints?
Reasoning such as this can also be applied to physics. An example from
cosmology is the work of Schmidhuber (1997, 2000) who has argued that it may
make sense to choose between different “theories of everything” on grounds of
computational complexity.
We demonstrated a number of different ways in which a computational attitude
toward the material being studied allows us to ask and answer questions that are
distinct from traditional scientific questions. This has been shown to be a valuable
perspective in zoology, molecular biology, medicine, psychology, and physics.
Answers to questions about the existence of structures in worldly phenomena
that store and process information, and their information capacity and computa-
tional speed of action, provide valuable scientific information. Without looking at
the world with computational eyes, these questions are unlikely to arise.
It is important to note that what we are doing here is different than simply
simulating these systems on the computer. In traditional modelling, the questions
being asked are identical to those that would be asked if the methodology being
used was a conventional experimental one. In contrast, in these arguments, the
nature of the model influences the kinds of questions being asked. Another
difference is that in this approach, we can learn a lot from when the simulation
“goes wrong” and does not reproduce the behavior seen in the real world.
312  Johnson
Copyright © 2005, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written
permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
Another important consequence is that this opens the possibility of exploiting the
computational capabilities of the world to create new kinds of computation. For
example, Feynman (1982) argued that we could respond in two ways to the
“problem” that quantum systems are difficult to simulate on computers: we can
regard this as a limitation on what computers can do, or we can regard this as
an opportunity to build new kinds of computers that are grounded in quantum
mechanical concepts.
 A generalization of this argument is as follows. If we are faced with a problem
in the world that appears to be inherently complex to compute, then we can take
one of two stances. First, we can say that the process is “not computable,”
“difficult to compute,” “computationally complex,” etc. However, a second
possibility arises—we can use that process as the basis of a new form of
computation. One of the main points of this chapter is that such an exploitation
may already have happened during the course of evolution of the mind, i.e., that
the mind has learned to exploit certain somatic systems to do computational
processes that might be too slow to carry out if done using on-substrate
processes.
Combining these Perspectives
The main aim of this chapter is to consider some of the consequences of
postclassical computation for the problems of embodiment. In particular, we can
ask the question of when the embodied mind might make use of modes of
computation that are not part of the substrate on which the (classically)
“computational” parts of the mind are being implemented. These processes
could be termed “off-substrate” computations. There are a number of reasons
why we might expect such phenomena to be observed. The most radical is that
there is some aspect of mental functioning that cannot in any way be carried out
using conventional computing machines. Arguments of this kind have been made
by Penrose (1989, 1995), who proposed that certain aspects of mental processing
cannot be carried out in a (classical) computational fashion. Instead, he proposed
that these functions might be carried out by quantum processes working
alongside traditional notions of mental functioning.
However, there are a number of other levels of arguments that are weaker than
those that show there are mental phenomena that are not computable in the
classical sense. One important reason may be that the result is computable, but
the use of some alternative process may facilitate faster computation. For
example, it was shown by Adamatzky (2001) that a diffusive chemical can solve
the problem of finding the shortest route through a maze. The chemical is
released through the maze and takes all possible routes. When it reaches a
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branch-point, some of the chemical will diffuse in one direction, some in a
different direction. This provides a kind of “parallelism on demand” that vastly
improves the efficiency of the search contrasted to traditional search. It is
feasible that off-substrate processing within the body is carried out for this
reason.
Importantly, the potential presence of such off-substrate processes is supple-
mentary to traditional on-substrate computation. One of the ways in which such
computation may work is that the traditional on-substrate processing prepares
information for input into an off-substrate process, and the output from that
process is then further processed using conventional neural processes.
An additional reason for using processes other than conventional computation is
the additional input/output capacities that are created by such processes. One
feature of the neural-network brain that is typically advantageous is its capacity
for processing many aspects of the world in parallel. However, this occasionally
is to its disadvantage, for example, when the mind needs to “pull together” to
dedicate most of its resources to attending to a danger signal. In such cases, there
is no on-substrate mechanism to force the attention of various mind mechanisms
toward the danger. By triggering a body state that will require attention by many
different mental mechanisms (for example, a sudden feeling of nausea or a rapid
heartbeat), there is a “massive synchronization” of mental resources, which
provides a counterweight to the usual “massive parallelism” of mental function-
ing. This will be discussed below in the context of somatic markers.
Extended Somatic Markers
Damasio (1994) introduced the notion of the somatic marker. Somatic markers
are bodily states that play a role in cognition, in particular, in the direction of
attention. Specifically, a somatic marker is some bodily state that is generated as
the consequence of some mental process. This state is then reperceived by the
mind, and as a consequence, the mental state is changed. An example of such
a marker is the rapid onset of nausea upon witnessing an act of violence. This
bodily state does not have any immediate relevance to the mental state that has
generated it, in contrast, say, to a feeling of nausea generated by viewing a plate
of rotting food. Some such states might be explained away as side effects, for
example, a rapid change of hormone levels upon witnessing violence in prepa-
ration for running from the danger might also trigger nausea.
The somatic marker hypothesis suggests that such reactions are not mere side
effects. Instead, they are ways of generating rapid shifts of attention, using the
body state in an arbitrary fashion to draw mental attention to the current situation.
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The presence of the marker in the body draws the mind’s attention toward it, and
as a consequence, the mind is focused on the meaning of that marker. It is
plausible that such phenomena are exaptations [i.e., co-options of previously
evolved functions to new ends (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Gould, 1991)] from
unwanted physical reactions to changes in body state, as discussed above.
We can see this as an example of off-substrate computation. The somatic
response is being used as a way of carrying out a process (bringing the attention
of many mental processes together to focus on a single danger point) that cannot
be carried out within the computational model implemented on the substrate.
An interesting question is whether it is important that such markers be somatic,
i.e., need they be internal body states? There are two questions to be answered
here. First, we can consider why it is important for the marker to exist in the body
and not just in the mind. Reasons for this are detailed in Damasio’s book, and a
particular viewpoint on this is given in the next section of the chapter. This section
will focus on the contrasting question: why does the marker need to be
constrained to reside within the body? One approach to this draws on ideas from
Dawkins’ (1992) book, The Extended Phenotype.
In biology, the phenotype is the expression of a gene or set of genes in the world,
for example, through physical structure or through influences on behavior. For
example, we can talk about the “blue-eyed” phenotype versus the “brown-eyed
phenotype” of some animal. This is distinguished from the “genotype,” i.e., the
set of genes of interest. Sometimes, more than one genotype can give rise to the
same phenotype (for example, where there are regressive traits).
The difficulty starts when we want to say where the boundary of the phenotype
lies. Clearly, certain things are in the phenotype, for example, the sequence of
proteins associated with a particular expression of a particular gene. A standard
definition would extend this to the whole body—genes influence the growth,
development, and activity of the body (alongside other influences).
Dawkins’ argument is that it is naive to simply say “everything inside the body,
phenotype; everything outside, not.” As an example, consider an imaginary
species of bird in which the male has a gene that predisposes itself to mate with
females that have blue feathers; it could be said that this gene is also a gene for
blue feathers in the female, and as a result of the presence of the gene, blue
feathers will spread through the female population. To abstract this, the genotype
in the male bird is having a phenotypic effect in the female bird. Why should we
regard the gene’s effect on the feathers of the female bird in any different way
than we regard another gene that causes the male bird to have red eyes?
A similar kind of argument can be made about the somatic marker hypothesis.
Damasio argued for a body-minded brain in which we create emotions via
“somatic markers.” These work when parts of the brain recognize an emotionally
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charged stimulus, and rather than create a direct link to an action on that stimulus,
the “marker,” consisting of a bodily reaction, is created. This is then reperceived
by the brain as the basis for action or for rapid alteration of emotional state. Why
do these markers have to be physically internal to the body? It would seem that
the same reasoning could be applied to markers that I leave in the external world
when I have an emotion. For example, if I am anxious, then I might scribble on
the pad of paper in front of me, without attending to this scribbling. This could
then become a marker, in this case, perceived via the eyes rather than through
proprioception. Why should it matter whether I use a bodily state or an external
state as the substrate for the marker?
It may be that there are reasons why somatic markers need to be somatic. One
could be that the speed of reaction required is just too quick to be capable of being
carried out by the external perceptive system. Another more convincing
explanation is that the reason we use somatic markers is to communicate with
multiple brain regions in a simultaneous and coordinated way, and therefore, we
need something that can be perceived in a direct way by different parts of the
brain.
This might be a continuum effect. An example of a phenomenon that might be
seen as either an external or somatic marker is biting nails when anxious. This
is, in many ways, an external physical process, but, nonetheless, we can perceive
the nail state internally via soreness of fingers. There must be other similar
examples. Perhaps nail-chewing is “causing” the anxiety (in the sense of being
part of the causal chain between subconscious perception of an anxiety-
producing stimulus and the affective response) rather than being an epiphenom-
enon of the emotional state.
Hardware Interlocks
In the previous section, we asked why the somatic marker needs to be
constrained to the body, and whether it is important to make a body-nonbody
distinction. In this section, we address the opposite question: why is it not
sufficient for the marker to be a mental marker? Why not just make a “mental
note”? While there are circumstances in which a truly somatic marker can get
transformed into a mental process in the limbic system, it is interesting to consider
whether there might be reasons why the evolution of the mind might have led to
the markers being body-centered rather than mind-centered.
One reason may be for safety. In the design of complex systems involving
computer-controlled mechanical and electrical devices, it is common for there to
be conservative safety devices included in the system, known as hardware
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interlocks (Leveson & Turner, 1993; Leveson, 1995). A hardware interlock is a
device that is independent of the main control system and that is designed to
monitor one small aspect of the system, typically by using its own sensor system.
For example, in a radiotherapy device, an interlock might exist that monitors the
output of radiation, and if more than a certain amount is let out in 1 minute, the
interlock shuts down the device completely.
Hardware interlocks are designed to be parts of the overall system that do not
depend on the abstraction offered by the overall control system. For example,
they do not take information from the main system sensors, they do not use the
main control system (for example, for timing), and they do not sit upon the
operating system abstraction used by the controlling structure. To do this would
compromise their role as safety-critical components. They provide a reassur-
ance of safety because they are separate; they are independent from the main
abstraction. If the main sensors go wrong, or the builder of the controller has
misunderstood the relationship between the abstraction offered by the operating
system and the real hardware and software, it does not matter.
One important role of the body-mind system is to react quickly and reliably to
dangerous phenomena. There would seem to be a prima facie case for thinking
that if engineers consider the use of such hardware interlocks as an important
way of responding to danger in computer-controlled systems, evolution may have
created such interlock systems for dangers to animals. It may be that our body-
grounded response to danger is a response of this kind. Instead of making a mind-
centered judgement about the danger of a situation, we make a rapid decision
based on a few simple cues. One characteristic of hardware interlocks is that
they typically work on a small number of basic sensors that facilitate a
conservative approximation to safety. The same may be true of interlocks in the
mind-body system: our sensory system perceives a small number of simple
“danger signals” (such as a rapid movement) and triggers an action within the
body immediately. This “massive synchronization” acts as a counterpart to the
more commonly discussed “massive parallelism” of the neural-network-based
mind.
Typically, the fact that the brain is a unified system with all aspects connected
and mutually accessible is seen to be to its advantage. Similarly, the unity found
in a complex software system is often seen as being to its advantage; instead of
having to connect individual components as needed (as might be the case in an
electronic system), all information is passed to a central repository and accessed
as needed. In some situations, it is necessary, for computers and for minds, for
the complete attention of the system to be directed toward one thing. Hardware
interlocks provide a way for such responses to “leap out” of the complexity of
the control software for certain emergency situations. This nondecomposability,
and the consequent need for a powerful way of leaping out of the complex
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interactions, would seem to be particularly strong for neural-network-based
systems, where the system is highly nondecomposable.
“Just Do It” Computation
Traditional computing is concerned with the construction of machines based on
various mathematical models of computing machines. One of the ideas in
postclassical computing is that many kinds of transformations in the world can
be regarded as computations by consistently ascribing informational values to the
objects involved in those transformations. Such “computers” carry out their
computations without regard to traditional notions of computational complexity.
For example, proteins fold consistently into complex three-dimensional shapes,
despite the complexity of this process. It was shown that a simplified model of
the protein-folding problem is NP complete (Berger & Leighton, 1995; Crescenzi,
1998; Fraenkel, 1993), and that an exhaustive search of all configurations would
take on the order of 1045 years (Levinthal, 1969). Nonetheless, real proteins fold
reliably within seconds. Similarly, adding new stars to a galaxy does not slow it
for computational reasons.
In such processes, the information (the positions of things in the world) is
transformed without any explicit computational effort; the object “just does it.”
We can imagine a new kind of computer-based problem solving based on this.
In traditional computation, the role of the computer is to compute the solution to
a problem directly, by applying algorithms that transform some representation of
the input into some representation of the output. However, if a sufficiently
flexible set of “just do it” (JDI) devices can be brought together, then there
remains the possibility of a new kind of computation. Instead of building a single
computing device, computational problem solving is seen as being about the
preparation of input for JDI devices, which are then allowed to complete their
calculations, output read offs, and interpret them. More complex processes may
require a number of JDI processes to be carried out.
A toy example of this is given by Dewdney (1988). This is an O(n) sorting
algorithm. A number of lengths of (uncooked) spaghetti are cut to the lengths of
the input to the algorithm. These lengths are gathered together and stood upright
on the table. The lengths can then be read off one-by-one from the longest
downwards. Note that the complexity of the process increases linearly with the
number of items being sorted. By contrast, a traditional computer increases in
complexity by O(nlogn) while carrying out a sorting process. The process of
standing the spaghetti on the table is a massively parallel JDI process.
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It is possible that some of the off-substrate processes in the somatically extended
mind are of this type, i.e., the on-substrate computation is preparing the input for
certain somatic processes to compute. In particular, decision making may be of
this kind. The “rational” outcomes of various options are being computed on-
substrate, and the final decision is made by a “gut feeling.” A related argument
has been made by Evans (2002). His argument is that one of the roles of emotion
is to solve the “search problem,” i.e., the problem of knowing where to stop when
calculating the consequences of a decision, that emotions “prevent us from
getting lost in endless explorations of potentially infinite search spaces.”
These “just do it” processes are similar to what Kauffman (1993, 1995)
described as “order for free.” For example, in this viewpoint, the occurrence of
the Fibbonacci sequence in the phyllotaxis of pinecones is not some miracle of
nature; it is simply the energetically cheapest way of generating the desired
structure.
A main part of his argument is that evolution will exploit such “order for free”
as an energetically cheap way of constructing complex organisms. Instead of
constructing new devices to achieve action, evolution pieces together various
devices available in the world to construct complex biological machines. In this
section, we made a similar argument with regard to the evolving mind exploiting
available computational devices in the world.
Conclusion
Does a functioning mind need a functioning body? Perhaps yes, if some parts of
mental functioning are delegated to off-substrate processes, either for the
purposes of computational efficiency or because certain processes (such as the
“massive synchronization” required to respond efficiently to danger) are not
available in the on-substrate model.
One perspective from which to view this is that of postclassical computation.
From this point of view, computation is seen as a property of things in the world,
rather than only as a property of specially constructed computing machines. This
allows us to ask questions about the computational capabilities of many different
objects. In particular, we can ask questions about the computational capabilities
of on-substrate processes and compare these to off-substrate processes. In
some cases, the off-substrate processes may have properties that are not
available on-substrate or that operate in a more efficient fashion than their on-
substrate equivalents. In such cases, we have a prima facie case for considering
that the off-substrate way of realizing that process might have been favored
during the evolution of mind.
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A particular example of an off-substrate process is the somatic marker, where
a body state is used as shorthand for some mental state that needs to be rapidly
appreciated by a number of parallel mental processes. This postclassical
computation stance allows us to consider the relationship between these on- and
off-substrate processes, and it provides the beginning of a way of determining
whether particular processes are likely to be carried out on-substrate using
connectionist networks, or whether they are likely to be delegated to other parts
of the body.
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